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Benoît Vermander, Chine brune ou
Chine verte? Les dilemmes de l’État-
Parti
Paris, Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2007, 212 pp.
Jean-Paul Maréchal
1 Three decades after its brilliantly successful conversion to market economy, and seven
years after its entry into the World Trade Organisation, China is now confronted with
intermeshed social and environmental threats that could well short-circuit a portion of
its patiently built achievements. The leadership’s decisions in the next few years could
as easily plunge China into a structural crisis as impart a new dynamism, says Benoît
Vermander.  China,  he  says,  is  caught  between  two  paradigms:  “brown  China”  and
“green China.” The first term stands for a strategy of social control, pursuit of high
growth rates whatever the social and ecological cost, and immediate maximisation on
the international arena of the advantages linked to the country’s rise. The second term
denotes political liberalisation and promotion of sustainable development as well as
international cooperation.
2 Naturally,  these  options  are  poles  apart,  two  ideal  types  that  delimit  the  area  of
possibilities as much as they define the government’s plans. Equally, there can be a
whole  range  of  possible  choices  in  between.  But  these  are  difficult  choices  for  the
authorities,  who have to find an “optimum” formula between internal tensions and
external  constraints,  or  in  other  words  simultaneously  (and  ideally)  pursue
“harmonious  society”  (retermed  “scientific  development”  since  2007)  at  home  and
“peaceful  rise  (or  development)”  internationally.  On  this  choice  depends  China’s
future, but also that of the world, given the Middle Kingdom’s central role on the global
arena.
3 Internal  tensions  stem  notably  from  rising  inequality  and  ecological  crisis.  A  2006
report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences said 10 percent of the richest families
in China held nearly half (45 percent) of private wealth, while the poorest 10 percent
held a mere 2 percent. In 2005, the richest decile of the population enjoyed incomes 12
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times those of  the poorest  decile.  In  addition to  these  inequalities,  of  a  magnitude
comparable to those in Latin America, there are a number of problems linked to land
distribution, health, education, and working conditions (4,700 deaths in mines every
year). As for ecological problems, they affect all strata and all milieus (water, air, and
soil). Some figures are worth noting: each year outside air pollution causes between
350,000 and 400,000 deaths, polluted water claims 60,000 lives, and by 2020 there will be
some 20 million ecological refugees. China is home to five of the world’s most polluted
cities,  70  to  80  percent  of  cancer  cases  diagnosed  in  Beijing  are  linked  to  the
environment, and the capital’s water table has fallen by 37 metres in 40 years. And
there were 161 serious ecological accidents in 2006. The list goes on.
4 It thus comes as no surprise to learn that in 2005 there were 87,000 protests involving
more than 100 people, of which 50,000 were over pollution. Along with these internal
problems are those of managing economic might on the international scene. How to
ease  several  years  of  uninterrupted  double-digit  growth  rates  while  keeping
weaknesses  at  bay,  and  without  engaging  in  potentially  ruinous  trade  conflicts  or
strategic rivalries? The Chinese doctrine is expressed in two words: “peaceful rise” or
“peaceful  development”  (this  second  formulation  being  deemed  less  aggressive).
Through  this  expression  popularised  in  2003,  the  authorities  were  signalling  the
following  action  guidelines:  identifying  Chinese  interests  as  being  part  of  those  of
developing  countries  (at  least  in  precept),  holding  fast  to  the  non-interference
principle,  proclaiming  the  peaceful  character  of  Chinese  culture,  and  supporting
multilateralism as a means of repelling antagonism to China’s rise.
5 The linkages between the internal and external equations consist in what some call the
“Beijing  consensus,”  meaning  the  doctrine  according  to  which  “(internal)  political
issues can only be addressed after economic development has reached a certain level.”
6 All  this  leads  to  a  “conditional  multilateralism,”  that  is  to  say  Beijing’s  balancing
between multilateral engagement (China, for example, joined the International Atomic
Energy  Agency  and  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  signed  30  environment
conventions,  has  preferred  to  abstain  rather  than  cast  a  veto  in  the  UN  Security
Council…) and instrumentalisation of the principles of  peaceful coexistence (mutual
respect,  non-aggression).  As  Vermander  analyses,  the  Chinese  conception  of
multilateralism is “founded on building ad hoc consensus regulated and tempered by
national sovereignty prerogatives.” In other words, “China feels more at ease in a long
term ‘constructivism’ than in a multilateral management of international crises.”
7 Suffice it to say that the Communist Party is confronted with growing domestic unrest
linked to environmental and social  problems, but also to the fact that the more an
economy develops, the more diverse and complex the stakes and demands — so much
so  that  while  the  Communist  Party  has  allowed the  country  to  score  political  and
economic successes, thereby assuring itself of a high degree of legitimacy in people’s
eyes, it could well fall victim to the pursuit of modernisation of society (how to limit
the powers that are being conceded) as well as to a serious economic and social crisis
(which could lead to the Party’s rupture). “If it transforms itself too little, the Party
loses touch with society. If it transforms itself too much, it loses its essence and its
clarity” (p.166). For now, the Party appears to be weakened more through corruption,
which hurts its image, and through some problems of “governance” than through a
strong  demand  from  society  for  Western-  style  democratisation,  which  General
Secretary Hu Jintao sees as a recipe for “impasse.” Hence the idea put forward by Hu of
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gradually developing democracy at the level of the Party’s 73 million members, which
the Party School theoreticians have dubbed “consultative democracy.”
8 So, brown China or green China? How can Europe help the Middle Kingdom choose the
better  alternative?  The  solution,  Vermander  says,  lies  in  an  open  and  pragmatic
attitude  to  which  theoreticians  would  have  no  objection:  “Play  the  multilateral
engagement game everywhere that China can make a positive contribution, and […]
derogate from these normal rules where China feels constrained, so as to ensure that
China’s  ‘conditional  multilateralism’  is  not  identical  to  an  instrumentalisation  of
principles that undermine international confidence and cooperation.” China needs to
be more deeply engaged in discussions to gradually establish global governance rules.
This  provides  the  European  Union  with  four  paths  of  reflection  and  action:  make
sustainable development and cultural diversity the major axis of relations with Beijing;
do everything to help China’s civil society nurture the emergence of a “green China”;
ensure strategic balance with the United States; and finally, avoid pitting India against
China. If these points are ensured, there will be a better chance of China taking the
green rather than the brown road. By becoming a major actor in the global arena, as
shown again in September 2008 through the first space walk by a “taikonaut,” China
has managed to ensure that  its  domestic  changes concern everyone.  It  is  therefore
gratifying that Vermander has presented, in a limpid style, his deep knowledge of the
Chinese world to help grasp some of the essential stakes in the new century.
9 Translated by N. Jayaram
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